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1. Introduction 
Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) have proliferated across countries and industries over the past 
two decades, as tariffs are constrained or eliminated by multilateral or bilateral trade 
agreements (World Trade Report, 2012). To minimize the impact of NTMs on global trade, 
member countries of the World Trade Organization (WTO) passed the agreement on the 
Sanitary and Phyto- Sanitary (SPS) measures and the agreement on the Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT) in 1995. On the one hand, the two agreements encourage member countries to 
adopt sanitary, phyto-sanitary, and technical measures that are based on the consensus reached 
on the science underlying them. On the other hand, the two agreements acknowledge 
members’ sovereign rights to ensure or promote food safety, animal welfare, or environmental 
sustainability (SPS, 1995; TBT, 1995). 
The political economy and potential protectionism of NTMs in international trade has 
been documented and numerous trade disputes have emerged from these frictions. Russia’s 
arbitrary restrictions in fish products have been analyzed by Elvestad and Nilssen (2010); 
Stanton (2012) provides a review of landmark WTO dispute cases on overly restrictive food 
safety measures such as the ban on hormone-fed beef and restrictions on genetically modified 
organisms in the European Union, restrictions on salmon importation by Australia, and 
restriction on apples by Japan and by Australia among other cases. Pork trade in Australia has 
also been restricted with protectionist SPS restrictions which were finally lifted in 2004 
(Beghin and Melatos, 2012). The United States has not been immune from such restrictive 
SPS policies as it has been shown in the case for the avocado dispute (Lamb, 2006; Peterson 
and Orden, 2008), and SPS restrictions on lemon trade (Cororaton and Peterson, 2012). Trade 
frictions as documented by official SPS concerns reported to the WTO by member countries 
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originate in both developed and developing economies (Disdier and van Tongeren, 2010). 
These reported frictions are especially frequent for raw meat and fish products and fruits and 
vegetables. Frictions are consistent with several motives such health risk issues, different 
approaches to risk including precautionary restrictions and stringent policies beyond 
international food standards, and protectionism. These motives are difficult to sort out. 
Are the NTMs more driven by protectionism or legitimate social causes such as risk 
mitigation in public health? What are the economic, political, and institutional determinants of 
NTMs? While empirical studies of the political economy of NTMs abound, few attend to 
disaggregated products with fine measurements of the restrictiveness of NTMs. Ray (1981) 
investigated the determinants of tariff and NTMs simultaneously for manufacturing industries. 
The restrictiveness of NTMs was measured categorically, i.e., whether a tariff line is subject 
to NTMs. Also focusing on the U.S. manufacturing industries, Trefler (1993) jointly estimated 
the determinants of NTMs and U.S. imports of manufactured goods. The measurement of 
NTMs was the coverage ratio, or the average number of NTM notifications per tariff line. 
Using the proportion of imports subject to NTMs as the measurement of NTM stringency, 
Mansfield and Busch (1995) found that NTMs were used more often in countries with high 
unemployment levels or appreciated currencies. Using the WTO’s NTM notification database, 
Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni (2008) found that NTMs significantly reduced OECD’ 
imports of agricultural products from non-member countries. However, the potential 
endogeneity of NTM notifications was left unaddressed in their analysis.  
In this article, we investigate the political economy of pesticide and veterinary drug 
regulations. We focus on this set of policies for two reasons. First, the abuse of pesticides and 
antibiotics in agriculture is among the most alarming food safety issues. For example, in 
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January 2014 the scandal involving pesticide-contaminated frozen food resulted in the 
resignation of the president of one of the largest agri-food companies in Japan.
1
 In December 
2013, the Food and Drug Administration of the United States issued new labelling guidelines 
to address the overuse of antibiotics in agriculture, because of its potential to increase 
bacterial resistance to antibiotics intended for humans.
2
 Second, the regulatory policy to rein 
in the abuse of pesticides and veterinary drugs usually takes the form of Maximum Residue 
Limit (MRL), which sets the maximum admissible rate of concentration (measured in parts 
per million or parts per billion) for a certain substance residue in a specific product. The 
numerical nature of MRLs allows a direct quantitative measurement of the regulatory 
stringency. 
We contribute to the understanding of food safety policy formation in two important 
ways. First, we propose a conceptual model to characterize policy makers’ joint decision on 
tariffs and food safety standards. Our model highlights the similarities and dissimilarities 
between the two policy instruments and provides a baseline for empirical analysis. Second, we 
develop an econometric specification consistent with the model to explain the formation of 
MRLs affecting pesticides and veterinary drugs residues for 253 commodities and 53 
countries. Our article is the first one in the political economy literature that formally 
investigates the determinants of food safety standards at a disaggregated product level and for 
a wide range of countries. 
We find that nations with higher income and larger population adopt stricter MRLs. 
We also find that countries set more stringent MRLs in their more competitive sectors. 
Moreover, we show that MRLs and import tariffs are substituting instruments for policy 
                                                          
1
 See the coverage from Nikkei Asian Review at http://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Trends/Frozen-food-industry-
must-put-house-in-order. 
2
 See The New York Times editorial “Antibiotic Use, and Abuse, on the Farms” of March 28, 2014. 
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makers. In addition, we find that countries with higher regulatory quality set tougher food 
standards. Our results are useful to policy makers and trade representatives engaged in 
regional and multilateral trade negotiations in which the balance between an open global 
economy and other social objectives is of key importance. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce a simple 
political economy framework to characterize policy makers’ optimal choices of tariffs and 
food safety standards. In Section 3 we derive an empirical specification from the conceptual 
model, followed by descriptions of data and discussions of regression results. We draw 
conclusions and policy implications in Section 4. 
2. The political economy framework 
2.1. The policy maker’s problem 
Unsafe food poses risk to public health and the ecosystem in general. Such social costs can be 
ignored by discounted by private markets, which calls for policy makers to set public food 
standards. However, influenced by lobbying efforts of domestic industries, policy makers may 
set excessive food safety standards to keep out foreign competition. Several conceptual 
models emerge from the literature to address the political economy of food safety standards. 
Fisher and Serra (2000) show that a domestic social planner always sets these standards above 
the level that maximizes the global welfare. Marette and Beghin (2010) find that policy 
makers may also prescribe overly low food safety standards if domestic producers are at a 
comparative disadvantage in compliance. Swinnen and Vandemoortele (2009) argue that 
policy makers generally set food safety standards more stringent than other food quality 
standards (e.g., nutrition contents) because of the risk to public health. 
The policy formation of food safety standards is inseparably from that of import 
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tariffs. From the viewpoint of a policy maker, standards-setting and border-taxing are two 
instruments to strike a balance between the interest of constituents, the interest of domestic 
industries, and the fiscal contribution of custom duties. Although the interaction of tariff and 
non-tariff measures is well understood, theoretical characterizations of policy makers’ joint 
decision-making are few. We provide a general political economy framework to underscore 
the similarities and dissimilarities between standards-setting and tariff-setting. 
We describe the policy maker’s problem in a small open economy using the political 
support function approach.
3
 Specifically, the policy maker chooses a specific duty   and a 
level of food safety standard   (with larger   indicating more stringency) to maximize the 
objective function W 
(1) ( , ) [ ( ) ( , ( ))] ( , ) [ ( ) ( , )]d dW CS p EC D p PS p c D p S p c          , 
where 1     , ( )p wp    , and ( )c c  . Note that  ,  , and   are the weights the 
policy maker assigns to constituents, domestic industries, and custom revenues. The function 
( )CS   is the consumer surplus function, which decreases in the market price p .4 In a small 
open economy, the market price p  exceeds the world price wp  (which increases in the level 
of standards in the destination market) by the specific duty  .5 Function ( )EC   measures the 
social cost of negative externality in food consumption associated with unsafe food.
6
 This cost 
decreases in the level of standards   but increases in the level of total food consumption. The 
function ( )D   is the Marshallian demand function governed by the same preferences as the 
                                                          
3
 See Hillman (2013) for a review of the political support function approach. See de Gorter and Swinnen (2002) 
for a survey of the applications to agricultural policies. 
4
 For brevity, other determinants of demand (e.g., income, taste, and abundance of substitutes) are omitted from 
the conceptual model but included in the empirical application. 
5
 Alternatively, the import tariff can be modeled as an ad valorem rate. We choose the specific duty approach to 
simplify the characterization of the optimal tariff rate. 
6
 As in Fisher and Serra (2000) and Marette and Beghin (2010), we assume that the externality is additively 
separable from the consumption utility. 
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function ( )CS  .  
The function ( , )dPS p c  is the domestic industry’s producer surplus that increases in 
the market price but decreases in a compliance cost parameter c , which implicitly depends on 
the level of standards in the home market. The function ( , )dS p c is the domestic supply 
function governed by the same cost structure as the function ( , )dPS p c . Finally, custom 
revenues are the product of the specific duty  and the quantity of imports ( D - dS ). 
2.2. The optimal choice of tariffs and food safety standard  
The policy maker’s joint decision on tariffs and standard stringency is characterized by the 
two first-order conditions resulted from the maximization of (1). Specifically, the first-order 
condition governing the optimal tariff is 
(2)  2 1( ) [ ( )] 0
d d dCS EC D S D S D S            , 
where iEC  is the partial derivative of the external cost function with respect to its i-th 
argument.
7
 Intuitively, equation (2) states that a higher tariff rate has three effects. First, it 
reduces constituents’ consumption utility ( 0CS  ) but mitigates the negative externality (
2 0EC   and 0D  ). Second, a higher duty rate benefits domestic producers by shielding 
them from foreign competition. Third, a higher tariff rate raises the per-unit revenue but 
reduces the tax base at customs. At the political economy optimum, the tariff is set at a level 
where these marginal benefits and costs cancel out. 
The optimal level of standard stringency is governed by the following first-order 
condition: 
(3)   2 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) [( ) ] 0
d d d dCS EC D wp EC S wp PS c D S wp S c                  , 
                                                          
7
 Note that we use the envelope theorem /d dPS p S   in the derivation of (2). 
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where 
2
dPS  is the partial derivative of domestic producer surplus with respect to the cost 
parameter, d
iS  is the partial derivative of the domestic supply with respect to its i-th argument. 
Intuitively, equation (3) says that a more stringent food safety standard reduces the 
consumption utility ( 0CS  ) but mitigates the external cost because quantity consumed falls 
( 2 0EC   and 0D  ) and the risk per unit of consumption is abated ( 1 0EC  ).  
On the supply side, tougher food safety standards raise the costs faced by both foreign 
competitors ( 0wp  ) and domestic industries ( 2 0
dPS  , 0c  ). Therefore, the net effect on 
the domestic producer surplus is ambiguous, hinging on whether domestic industries have 
comparative advantages in compliance with the standard. Finally, more a stringent food safety 
standard can affect the quantity of import in either direction. The key determinant is also the 
comparative advantage of domestic industries over foreign competitors in compliance. 
The political economy optimal tariffs and food safety standard are implicitly defined 
by the system of equations (2) and (3). It is worth noting that the two equations have several 
components in common.
 8
 In fact, all shared elements involve the impacts of price changes. 
The marginal effect of a specific duty directly translates into the marginal effect of the market 
price. Equation (2) says that the optimal political economy tariff is set such that the marginal 
impact of a price change on the political economy is null. Consequently, we simplify the 
characterization of the political economy optimal standard by substituting (2) into (3) to get 
(4)  1 2 2[ ( ) ] 0
d d dEC PS c S c D S wp            . 
The political economy optimal level of the food safety standard, * , is implicitly defined by 
equation (4), that is, 
                                                          
8
 See Swinnen, Olper, and Vandemoortele (2011) for a systematic investigation of the interaction between 
different types of policy instruments, ranging from border taxations to domestic farm legislations and how these 
are conditioned by quality of institutions and the importance of tax revenue motives. 
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(5)  *
1 2 2( , , ; ; , , ; , , )
d df EC PS c S M wp      , 
with imports dM D S  . Intuitively, equation (5) states that the political economy optimal 
standard is determined by the political weights and influence, risk mitigation per unit of 
consumption, production and compliance costs for domestic industries, current tariff rate, 
current import volume, and the compliance cost for foreign producers. Therefore, equation (5) 
provides a guideline for empirical investigations, which we pursue next. 
3. The empirical application to MRLs 
In this section we investigate the economic, political, and institutional determinants of the 
MRLs on insecticides and antibiotic drugs. First, we specify a regression equation based on 
equation (5) in the previous section. Second, we describe the MRL data and the explanatory 
variables. Third, we present the econometric results and discuss the policy implications. 
Finally, we check the sensitivity of the results with respect to commodity groups and omitted 
national characteristics. 
3.1. The empirical approach 
3.1.1. The model specification 
To implement equation (5) empirically, we classify the determinants of the food safety 
standards into three categories: demand-side factors, supply-side factors, and political or 
institutional factors. The demand-side category contains the risk mitigation per unit of 
consumption ( 1EC ). The magnitude of this risk mitigation effect depends on the product 
characteristics, the total consumption quantity, which is derived from consumers’ preference, 
income, and socio-demographical variables. The supply-side category includes the production 
and compliance costs faced by domestic industries ( 2
dPS , 2
dS , and c ), the compliance cost 
faced by foreign competitors ( wp ), and the quantity of import ( M ). The political and 
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institutional category includes the endogenous tariff rate ( ), and political weights assigned to 
voters-consumers, special supply interest, and fiscal considerations ( ,  , and  ). 
Since our empirical application involves multiple products, we normalize the supply-
side factors in equation (5) by the supply conditions in the rest of the world. In particular, we 
use the comparative advantages of domestic industries to control for the competitiveness. 
Furthermore, we include import penetration rate to measure the each sector’s dependency on 
the global market. Therefore, we propose the following specification based on equation (5): 
(6)  * e i n ca ip l l
jk k jk j j jk jk jk j
l
E I N CA IP T Z                ,  
where j and k  are country and product indices, and  s are parameters to be estimated. Note 
that the product-specific intercept controls for product characteristics such as risk per unit of 
consumption. The determinants of the standard in equation (6) include the price elasticity of 
demand for the product  in each country jkE , the level of income jI , the population of the 
nation jN , the comparative advantage of the domestic industry jkCA , the import penetration 
rate in the country and industry of interest jkIP , the current rate of import tariff jkT , and other 
macroeconomic, political, and institutional characteristics ljZ  at the country level.  
3.1.2. The estimation procedure 
Because policy makers decide on the import duties and standards simultaneously, the tariff 
rate in (6) is subject to endogeneity. We use the instrumental approach to address the problem. 
In particular, we take advantage of the fact that the applied tariff rates in each country cannot 
be higher than the bound duty rates in the trade agreements to which the country has 
committed. The bound duty rates result from past multilateral trade agreements and therefore 
exogenous to the policy-making processes in individual countries. Consequently, we can 
10 
 
estimate equation (6) using the 2-stage least square procedure, with the bound duty rates as 
instrumental variables for applied tariff rates.
9
 
3.2. The data 
3.2.1. The measurement of MRL stringency 
The global MRL database, available from the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA), contains the currently effective MRLs on 
pesticides and veterinary drugs across a wide range of products and countries (USDA-FAS). 
Each MRL addresses a specific substance (i.e., pesticide or drug type) in a specific 
commodity in a specific country (including Codex in the set of countries). Using these MRLs 
as of April 2012, Li and Beghin (2014) constructed the following MRL stringency index at 
the country and product level: 
(7)
 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
,
1( ) ,
1
= exp( ),
k
k k
k k
N
codex kn jkn
jk
nk codex kn
MRL MRL
MRL
N MRL


 
where 
( )kjkn
MRL is the MRL set by country j , for product k , and targeting substance ( )kn ;  
( ), kcodex kn
MRL  is the MRL recommended by Codex for the same product and substance 
combination; and ( )kN  
is the number of substances applicable to product k .  
Intuitively, equation (7) states at the MRL stringency towards a certain product in a 
certain country is an average stringency over MRLs targeting all relevant substances used in 
producing the product and with each individual MRL referenced to its Codex counterpart in 
percent deviation from Codex. The MRL stringency score has three practical merits.
 10
 First, 
the reference to the Codex MRLs accommodates the scientific fact that some pesticides or 
                                                          
9
 To accommodate the few unbound duty rates, we apply the normal distribution function to all bound rates and 
assign the value unity (the upper limit of a probabilistic distribution) when tariffs are unconstrained. 
10
 See Li and Beghin (2014) for more discussions of the properties of the stringency scores. See Xiong and 
Beghin (2014) for an assessment of the trade effects of the MRLs in pesticides.  
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veterinary drugs pose greater risks than others. Second, the measurement of the MRL 
stringency increases in individual MRLs. In particular, unity serves as a useful benchmark for 
equation (7): a score above (or below) one indicates that the MRL regulation is more (or less) 
restrictive than Codex. Third, the exponential transformation expresses the convexity of the 
cost of complying with stringency much beyond the Codex recommendations, which could 
become very steep. This is consistent with the fact the SPS and TBT agreements encourage 
WTO member countries to harmonize MRLs towards the Codex levels to avoid such cost. 
We use the MRL stringency scores from Li and Beghin (2014) for 253 products in 53 
countries as the measurement of food safety standards.
11
 Our country coverage is broader that 
most of the previous studies (e.g., Anderson, Rausser, and Swinnen, 2013; Swinnen, Olper, 
and Vandemoortele, 2012). In particular, we include many less and least developed nations 
that are absent in the previous studies.
12
 The products under investigation are also more 
disaggregated (at either 4 or 6 digit level in the Harmonized System classification) than in the 
recent literature.
13
 As of 2013, the products and countries of interest account for more than 
90% of the world agricultural trade. We use Figure 1 to illustrate the cross-region discrepancy 
in MRL policies. In particular, we find that advanced economies tend to adopt MRLs that are 
more stringent than the Codex recommendations, while developing countries often use less 
restrictive policies. Stringency in the EU block in particular stands out. In NAFTA, Canada 
has kept more stringent MRLs than the US, and Mexico has aligned its MRL on the US. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
3.2.2. The determinants of MRLs 
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 Since the European Parliament sets the MRLs in the European Union, we use an aggregate EU entity to 
represent all 28 member nations. 
12
 See Table A in Appendix A for the list of countries. 
13
 See Table B in Appendix B for the list of products. 
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All determinants of MRLs are measured as of 2011unless noted otherwise. The elasticity of 
demand for a product hinges on the number of substituting goods. We use the number of 
commodities within the same tariff line to approximate the responsiveness of demand to price 
changes.
14
 To control for the market size, we use per-capita income data and population 
estimates from the World Bank Indicators. In particular, we measure the per-capita income on 
the basis of purchasing power parity in order to adjust for price differences across countries. 
To measure the competitiveness of a given industry in a given country, we obtain the 
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) using  data from the COMTRADE database of the 
United Nations. Specifically, the RCA is computed as the export share of the product in the 
country’s total export, divided by the export share of the same product in the total exports of 
the rest of the world (Balassa, 1965). We also use the effectively applied tariff rates and 
bounded tariff rates from the TRAINS database.  
We now consider several macroeconomic, political, and institutional factors that 
potentially affect the formation of MRLs. A country’s macroeconomic policy impacts the 
competitiveness of its agricultural sector through influencing the terms of trade. We use the 
real exchange rate from Heston et al. (2009) to control for the effect of macroeconomic 
policies. 
We also consider two political factors in the standards-setting process. First, the 
effectiveness of lobbying efforts from industry groups hinges on the political spectrum within 
the legislative branch of government. A more diverse body of law makers makes lobbying 
more costly but also makes policy reforms less likely. To control for the differences in 
legislative organizations, we use the legislative index of electoral competitiveness (LIEC) 
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 Formal estimates of demand elasticities for the products and countries of interest are non-existent in the 
literature. 
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from the Database of Political Institutions 2010 of the World Bank.  The LIEC accounts for 
the number of candidates within a party and the dominance of the largest party in legislature. 
Second, political stability affects policy makers’ perspective on short-term versus long-term 
objectives. A more stable regime makes systemic reforms of public policies more likely. We 
measure political stability by the number of years a country is in an autocratic or democratic 
status, available from the Database of Political Institutions 2010 of the World Bank. 
Finally, we consider two institutional factors that vary significantly across countries. 
First, the implementation cost of food safety standards is much higher than that of traditional 
trade barriers. Therefore, governments with poorer regulatory quality are less likely to resort 
to food safety standards. We use the regulatory quality index from the World Bank as a 
measurement of the efficiency of government. Second, socio- demographics in rural areas 
plays an important role in farm-related policies and possibly permeates the formation of food 
safety standards. We use the ratio of farm employment over farm land from the World Bank 
as the measurement in our empirical investigation. 
3.3. The benchmark results 
We present the results from the 2-stage least square procedure in Table 1. We discuss the 
formation of MRLs first. We find that applied import tariffs and MRLs are policy substitutes 
for policy makers. This result suggests that policy makers adopt stringent MRLs to shield 
domestic industries from international competition as import duties are constrained and 
reduced by various trade agreements. The response of the MRL to the tariff is strong (an 
elasticity of -5.45 at the mean of the dataset). This is the strongest response of the MRL to 
variation in its political economy determinants.  
14 
 
Table 1. The political economy of MRLs, with endogenous applied tariff rates 
Variables MRL stringency score equation 
2
nd
 stage 
Tariff equation 
1
st
 stage 
 Coefficient MRL elasticity 
wrt determinant 
Coefficient 
Applied tariff rate -0.417 
(0.055) 
-5.453 N.A. 
    
Bound tariff rate* n.a. n.a. 0.392 
(0.014) 
    
Log of real per-capita GDP 0.113 
(0.007) 
0.105 0.032 
(0.004) 
    
Log of population 0.060 
(0.003) 
0.056        -0.030 
(0.002) 
    
Log of real exchange rate -0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.004 0.007 
(0.001) 
    
Log of the number of products 
within the same tariff line 
0.007 
(0.003) 
0.006 0.007 
(0.002) 
    
Number of regional trade 
agreements 
-0.033 
(0.002) 
-1.150 0.012 
(0.001) 
    
Log of the Revealed 
Comparative Advantage 
-0.007 
(0.001) 
-0.006 
 
0.000 
(0.001) 
    
Log of Ag import penetration -0.018 
(0.005) 
-0.017        -0.049 
(0.003) 
    
Log of the longevity of the 
regime 
-0.027 
(0.004) 
-0.025        -0.016 
(0.003) 
    
Regulatory quality 0.067 
(0.007) 
0.018        -0.015 
(0.004) 
    
Ag labor/land ratio -0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.000 0.016 
(0.002) 
    
Legislative competitiveness 
dummy 1** 
-0.377 
(0.026) 
-0.350        -0.051 
(0.016) 
    
Legislative competitiveness 
dummy 2** 
-0.366 
(0.021) 
-0.340 
 
0.037 
(0.013) 
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Legislative competitiveness 
dummy 3** 
0.026 
(0.021) 
0.024        -0.065 
(0.013) 
    
Legislative competitiveness 
dummy 4** 
0.034 
(0.016) 
0.032 0.122 
(0.010) 
    
R
2
 0.17 n.a. 0.17 
Note: *Denotes the instrumental variable for the applied tariff rate. The Hausman-Durbin-Wu test rejects the 
exogeneity of applied tariff rate at 1% significance level. Product dummy variables are included in both stages 
of the estimation. **The elasticity is the percent change in the MRL score for a score regulated in each of the 4 
legislative regimes relative to the most competitive legislative regime subsumed in the intercept. 
 
Next, we find that countries with higher per-capita income adopt more stringent 
MRLs. This is because the public’s awareness of food safety, animal welfare, and 
environmental sustainability tends to rise with the income level. The income elasticity of the 
MRL is 0.10 at the mean of the dataset. The result suggests that the policy formation of 
MRLs is partly driven by legitimate social objectives. We also find that more populous 
nations tend to implement more stringent MRLs. The elasticity is not as large as for income, 
at 0.06. This population response suggests that public health has more at stake in a nation 
with more residents; food demand is larger and the potential externality is larger as well.  
Furthermore, countries with weaker currencies use less restrictive MRLs, but this 
result is barely statistically significant and the elasticity is very small and is dwarfed by other 
determinants. In addition, we find that countries adopt more stringent MRLs in sectors where 
the demands for the products are more sensitive to price changes but this effect is moderate, 
with an elasticity of 0.01 at the mean. This result can be rationalized with compliance costs 
of MRLs being passed on to consumers to a lesser degree in a market where the demand is 
more elastic. Finally we find that countries committed to more regional trade agreements use 
less stringent MRLs. This finding indicates the effectiveness of regional trade agreements in 
bringing moderation in setting food safety and other NTMs. This effect is quite strong with 
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an elasticity of -1.15. 
Next we discuss the political factors underlying the formation of MRLs. Countries 
adopt less stringent MRLs in sectors where the domestic producers are more competitive in 
the world market. The estimated effect is small (elasticity of -0.01). Lobbying efforts and 
political donations tend to decrease with international competitiveness. Countries more 
dependent on agricultural imports tend to implement less restrictive MRLs. But again this 
effect is moderate (elasticity of -0.02). In addition, more entrenched regimes use moderately 
less restrictive MRLs (elasticity of -0.03). 
Finally, we address the institutional determinants of MRLs. Governments with better 
regulatory quality implement slightly tougher MRLs (elasticity of 0.02). The design and 
enforcement of MRLs require expertise from technocrats and coordination among different 
bodies of the government. Therefore, administrative costs of MRLs are relatively lower in 
governments with higher regulatory quality. This result is consistent with the analytical 
results of Swinnen et al. (2011) on the impact of institutional capacity of countries on policy 
choices. Regarding the competitiveness of the legislative branch of government, competition 
among law makers leads to more stringent MRLs in agriculture. This can be seen by 
comparing the sizeable negative fixed effects of dummy 1 and dummy 2 with the small 
positive fixed effects of dummy 3 and dummy 4 relative to the most competitive legislative 
regime (the omitted category among the 5). More backward political systems (regime 
dummy 1 and 2) may hinder policy debate and regulatory effort to protect public health 
which can be done in more competitive legislative regimes (the other 3 categories). There is a 
slight inverted U shape effect as regimes 3 and 4 are characterized by slightly higher MRL 
scores than the most competitive legislative regime subsumed in the intercept. A similar 
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finding on farm income support was reported by Beghin and Kherallah (1994). 
Next, we discuss the results from the tariff equation, or the first-stage estimation in 
Table 1. Using the Hausman-Durbin-Wu test, we reject the null hypothesis that the applied 
tariff rate is exogenous to MRLs. This test result suggests that policy makers choose the 
import duties and MRLs simultaneously.  
In terms of the tariff determinants, we find that bound tariff rates act as strong 
binding constraint on the applied duty rates. Regarding the economic determinants of applied 
tariffs, richer and less populous countries protect domestic agricultural markets to a larger 
degree. This is possibly because agricultural industries in those countries are better organized 
and execute more lobbying efforts. We also find that nations with weaker currencies impose 
higher tariffs. Moreover, we find that heavier duties are imposed on sectors where the 
demands for the products are more sensitive to price changes. The reason is that border duties 
are less reflected in market prices in those sectors. Unexpectedly, applied tariff rates are 
higher in countries that are engaged in more regional trade agreements, other things being 
equal. However, as we have seen above, countries committed to more regional trade pacts 
adopt less restrictive MRLs and also have presumably lower bound tariffs through their RTA 
commitments. The result here captures the small “anti-liberalization” effect through applied 
tariff but conditioned on bound tariffs commitments and moderation in MRLs. 
Regarding political and institutional determinants of import tariffs, we find that the 
comparative advantage at the product level has negligible impacts on the tariff rate. One 
possible reason is that different growing and marketing seasons of fresh plant products 
attenuate the competition between domestic and foreign industries in agriculture. For 
possibly similar reasons, we find that countries more dependent on agricultural imports tend 
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to levy lower tariffs. We also find that import duties are lower in countries with higher 
political stability and better regulatory quality. One possible reason is that market 
liberalization is more likely to happen in those regimes. Furthermore, we find that countries 
with higher agricultural labor-to-land ratio impose higher import duties. This is possibly 
because protectionism in agriculture is more essential to social stability when more farmers 
tend to be small-scaled and unproductive due to the lack of capital or technological 
resources. Finally, we find that the degree of competition within the legislative branch of the 
government does not affect the degree of tariff liberalization monotonically.  
3.4. The sensitivity analysis 
In this subsection we provide two robustness checks for our empirical results and investigate 
the formation of MRLs in more detail.  
3.4.1. The difference between pesticides and antibiotics regulations 
In the first sensitivity analysis, we distinguish the MRLs on veterinary drugs applied to animal 
products from those on pesticides applied to plant products. The two types of MRLs address 
two kinds of social hazards: regulations on veterinary drugs mitigate the risks directly posed 
to animals and indirectly posed to human health in the long run; regulations on pesticides 
address the sanitary risks of human consumption of plant products. To discern the two policy 
objectives, we re-estimate equation (6) with the sub-sample consisting of MRLs regulating 
veterinary drugs only. The sub-sample contains 941 observations, or 8% of all observations.
15
 
We report the associated results in Table 2. Results using the much larger subset of products 
with pesticides MRLs only are nearly identical to those shown in Table 1 and are not 
reproduced here.   
                                                          
15
 The corresponding animal products belong to three HS chapters: 2, 4, and 15. See Appendix A for product 
descriptions. 
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Table 2. The political economy of MRLs targeting veterinary drugs 
Applied tariff rate    0.411 
(0.215) 
Log of the longevity of the 
regime 
   -0.005 
(0.013) 
    
Log of real per-capita GDP 0.085 
(0.018) 
Regulatory quality 0.046 
(0.018) 
    
Log of population 0.060 
(0.003) 
Ag labor/land ratio 0.001 
(0.007) 
    
Log of real exchange rate   -0.002 
(0.007) 
Legislative competitiveness 
dummy 1 
   -0.125 
(0.065) 
    
Log of the number of products 
within the same tariff line 
0.003 
(0.009) 
Legislative competitiveness 
dummy 2 
   -0.145 
(0.053) 
    
Number of regional trade 
agreements 
  -0.022 
(0.005) 
Legislative competitiveness 
dummy 3 
    0.095 
(0.061) 
    
Log of the Revealed 
Comparative Advantage 
  -0.001 
(0.005) 
Legislative competitiveness 
dummy 4 
0.033 
(0.041) 
    
Log of Ag import penetration   -0.009 
(0.012) 
R
2
 0.11 
Note: Bound tariff rate is used as the instrumental variable for the applied tariff rate. Product dummy 
variables are included in both stages of the estimation. The first-stage estimation is omitted for brevity. 
As shown in Table 2, we find that impact of the applied tariffs on MRLs has become  
not statistically significant at the 5% confidence level and that the sign of the impact has 
changed. This finding suggests that the MRLs on antibiotics are less driven by protectionism 
than those on pesticides. We also find that the income effect is less pronounced than in Table 
1, which indicates that sanitary risks are more of a concern than sanitary risks in high-income 
countries. Other results are qualitatively similar to the benchmark findings. 
3.4.2. Accounting for unobservable national characteristics 
In the second robustness check, we address the potential biases due to the omission of 
unobservable country-level characteristics. Some economic, political, or institutional factors 
are unmeasurable but possibly contribute to the political design of tariffs and MRLs. To 
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address this concern, we conduct an augmented 2SLS regression in which we include the 
countries’ fixed effects in both stages. As a practical matter, the presence of country-specific 
fixed effects makes the income, population, and other country-level explanatory variables 
redundant. That is, we rely solely on the cross-product variations to identify the empirical 
model. We report the associated results in Table 3. 
Table 3. The political economy of MRLs, with countries’ fixed effects 
Applied tariff rate   -0.264 
(0.068) 
Log of the Revealed 
Comparative Advantage 
   -0.002 
(0.001) 
    
Number of number of products 
within the same tariff line 
   0.015 
(0.003) 
R
2
 0.61 
Note: Bound tariff rate is used as the instrumental variable for the applied tariff rate. Products’ and countries’ 
dummy variables are included in both stages of the estimation. The first-stage estimation is omitted for brevity. 
As shown in Table 3, we are able to identify the impacts of three determinants that 
vary across products. First, we reinforce our benchmark result that tariffs and MRLs are used 
by policy makers as substituting policy instruments. Second, we re-affirm that more stringent 
MRLs are adopted in products for which consumers’ demands are more sensitive to price 
changes. Third, we find weak evidence that countries impose less restrictive MRLs in their 
more competitive sectors. 
4. Conclusions 
The political economy and determination of food safety standards are of great importance as 
trade integration and globalization deepen on one hand and the public’s demand for social 
objectives rises on the other. We contribute to the understanding of the policy formation of 
food safety standards in two ways. First, we provide a conceptual framework to characterize 
policy maker’s joint decision on import duties and food safety standards, which address the 
negative externality of food consumption. The proposed conceptual model provides a 
guideline for empirical investigations of food safety standards, or non-tariff measures in 
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general. Second, in a case study of MRLs on pesticides and veterinary drugs regulating food 
in a large set of countries, we illustrate the roles of economic, political, and institutional 
factors in the formation of food safety standards. In particular, we find that nations with 
higher income and larger population adopt stricter food safety standards. We also find that 
countries set more stringent MRLs in their more competitive sectors. Moreover, we document 
that policy makers use MRLs and tariffs as substitute policy instruments and that the 
substitution is high. 
Future research in the political economy of food safety standards can be pursued along 
several dimensions. First, panel data with time variation in the MRLs would allow better 
quantification of the economic, political, and institutional determinants. Second, 
interdisciplinary collaboration is needed to gauge the size the social benefits of tightening 
food safety standards. Third, private food standards used by private food processors and 
retailers often exceed their public counterparts and the relationship between the determination 
of public and private food standards is worth exploring.  
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Appendix A. The list of countries 
Table A. Names of countries, in alphabetical order 
Albania Cuba Japan Russia 
Algeria Dominican Rep. Jordan Saint Lucia 
Argentina Ecuador Kenya Singapore 
Australia Egypt Malaysia South Africa 
Bahamas El Salvador Mexico Sri Lanka 
Bangladesh European Union
*
 Morocco Taiwan 
Barbados Guatemala New Zealand Thailand 
Brazil Honduras Nicaragua Trinidad and Tobago 
Canada Hong Kong Pakistan Tunisia 
Chile India Panama Turkey 
China Indonesia Peru United Arab Emirates 
Colombia Israel Philippines United States 
Costa Rica Jamaica Rep. of Korea Venezuela 
   Vietnam 
Note: * European Union represents the 28 member countries. 
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Appendix B. The list of products 
Table B. Names of countries, by chapters of the Harmonized System 
Chapter code and description Products of this study 
HS-02: Meat and edible meat offal Cattle meat, cattle kidney, cattle liver, other cattle 
byproducts, hog meat, hog fat, hog kidney, hog liver, 
other hog byproducts, poultry meat, poultry fat, poultry 
kidney, poultry liver, other poultry byproducts, sheep 
meat, sheep kidney, sheep liver, and other sheep 
byproducts.      
HS-04: Dairy produce; bird eggs; 
natural honey; edible products of 
animal origin 
Eggs, milk, and milk fat. 
HS-06: Live trees and other plants; 
bulbs, roots and the like; cut flowers 
and ornamental foliage 
Edible canna, chicory roots, chufa, and dasheen corm. 
HS-07: Edible vegetables and certain 
roots and tubers 
Amaranth leafy, arracacha, arrowroot, artichoke, Chinese 
artichoke, Jerusalem artichoke, arugula, asparagus, 
Balsam pear, bean, Adzuki bean, broad bean, dried broad 
bean, succulent broad bean, dried bean, podded edible 
bean, Kidney bean, Lablab bean, Lima bean, Moth bean, 
Mung bean, Navy bean, Rice bean, Runner bean, Snap 
bean, Tepary bean, Urd bean, Yardlong bean, garden beet 
root, garden beet top, broccoli, Chinese broccoli, Raab 
Broccoli, Brussels Sprouts, butternut, cabbage, Chinese 
Bok-Cho cabbage, Chinese Napa cabbage, carrot, cassava 
leaves, cassava roots, cauliflower, celeriac root, celery, 
Chinese celery, chervil, Turnip chervil root, chickpea, 
chicory tops, edible chrysanthemum, collards, corn salad, 
sweet corn kernels, cowpea, cress, Garden cress, Upland 
cress, cucumber, dandelion leaves, dock, eggplant, endive, 
fennel, Florence fresh fennel, garlic, edible, gourd, guar, 
horseradish, jackbean, kale, kohlrabi, leeks, lentil, leren, 
lettuce head, lettuce leaf, mizuna, mushroom, mustard 
greens, mustard spinach, okra, olive, green onion, Welsh 
onion, onion bulb, orach, turnip-rooted parsley, fresh 
parsley, parsnip, pea, dried pea, edible podded pea, green 
pea, Pigeon pea, succulent pea, sugar snap pea, non-bell 
pepper, pimentos, potato, pumpkin, garden purslane, 
winter purslane, radish, radish top, green rape, rutabaga 
root, rutabaga top, salsify root, salsify top, shallots, 
skirret, spinach, New Zealand spinach, Vine spinach, 
summer squash, winter squash, sweet potato, Swiss chard, 
swordbean, tanier, taro, tomato, turnip, turnip top, 
watercress, yam bean, and true yam tuber. 
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Appendix B (continued) 
Table B (continued). Names of countries, by chapters of the Harmonized System 
Chapter code and description Products of this study 
HS-08: Edible fruits and nuts; peel 
of citrus fruit or melons 
Almond, apple, apricot, avocado, Balsam apple, banana, 
beechnut, blackberry, blueberry, boysenberry, 
calamondin, cantaloupe, cashew, chayote fruit, cherry, 
chestnut, citron citrus, coconut, crabapple, cranberry, 
currant, date, dewberry, elderberry, passion fruit, 
gooseberry, grape, grapefruit, ground cherry, guava, 
hazelnut, honeydew, huckleberry, juneberry, kiwifruit, 
kumquat, lemon, lime, loganberry, loquat, mango, melon, 
muskmelon, nectarine, Brazil nut, hickory nut, 
Macadamia nut, pine nut, papaya, pawpaw, peach, pear, 
oriental pear, pecan, pepino, pineapple, pistachio, 
plantain, dried plum prune, fresh plum prune, 
pomegranate, pomelo, quince, raisin, raspberry, 
strawberry, tangelo, tangerine, tomatillo, walnut, 
watermelon, and youngberry.    
HS-09: Coffee, tea, mate and spices Ginger, pepper, and summer savory. 
HS-10: Cereals Barley, corn, corn pop, lupin, pearl millet, proso millet, 
oat, rice, sorghum, and wheat. 
HS-12: Oil seeds and oleaginous 
fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds 
and fruits; industrial or medicinal 
plants; straw and fodder 
Cotton seed, dried hop cones, mustard seed, peanut, 
rapeseed, sesame seed, soybean, sugar beet roots, sugar 
cane, and sunflower seed. 
HS-15: Animal or vegetable fats and 
oils and their cleavage  products 
prepared edible fats; animal or 
vegetable waxes 
Cattle fat, hog fat, poultry fat, and sheep fat. 
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Figure 1. Maximum Residue Limit stringency scores across countries and regions 
 
Note: European Union represents all 28 member countries. 
 
